Tanta Has Died

One of the most valuable resources I encountered in the past few years was Tanta, recently co-blogger on Calculated Risk.  I do not remember exactly when I had begun reading CR, but do remember when she had agreed to write for the blog.  She was able to take a normally dry topic and make it incredibly accessible.  I am remembering especially her humor, with references to steel-toed bunny slippers, bourbon slurpees, and delightful metaphors of risk, like this: “Buying a B tranche of a subprime ABS is playing with matches. Buying the equity tranche of a CDO is playing with a blowtorch in the parking lot of the Exxon station while wearing a St. Lucia wreath on your head.”

It is with no surprise I learn she had a graduate degree in English, given her professed fondness for American Lit nerds and literary allusions that I myself would have trouble placing.  Her postings collected in “The Compleat ÜberNerd” should be considered mandatory reading for anyone involved or interested in mortgage origination, servicing, and securitization.  For those of us who follow CR this is a tragic loss, but I am glad that in her last few years she was able to touch so many.  Tanta vive!

http://calculatedrisk.blogspot.com/2008/11/sad-news-tanta-passes-away.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/business/01tanta.html?_r=1
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2008/12/on_the_loss_of_tanta_1.html

Adjusting Targets

The week before last saw the market pull a Wiley E. Coyote, slicing through my intermediate target to just below my long term target. When this happens, it’s time to re-examine those targets. The tools for doing so include both traditional fundamental measures, as well as some technical analysis.

What I am currently looking at is the long-term earnings growth of the S&P 500 index (about 6%) and how it relates to current pricing.  In April 2007 Hussman discusses fair value, suggesting 850 as consistent with long-term earnings (a little under 930 today).  I would consider a P/E ratio of 15 (the long term average) to mark “fair value”, and also consistent with the above estimates.  However, markets overshoot.  Historical starting points for secular bull markets have P/E ratios around 7.  I’m willing to be generous and use an estimate of 10, which would imply S&P 500 lows around 600.  Note that P/E ratios may be calculated using either trailing or forward earnings, net or operating earnings, and should be corrected to account for cyclical trends in earnings.  Robert Shiller has suggested techniques for such adjustments.

Trend-wise, I would place us in the middle of a secular bear market. This follows the secular bull of ’82 to ’00, which in turn followed the bear of ’66 to ’82, the bull of ’49 to ’66, et cetera. The lifespan of a bear is obviously related to the severity of its losses; most of the damage from a slow sideways grind comes from inflation rather than falling asset prices. I would therefore pick 2014 as a endpoint for a market that trades mostly sideways, and remain open to the idea of steep declines allowing a quicker recovery.

I’ve included below a weekly chart of the S&P 500 for the past 80 years. The long-term trend line presents what I’d like to consider a lower bound.  (As an aside, the trend line approximates annual growth of about 6%.)  I still maintain expectations for a strong rally, possibly preceded by a significant drop, as the most likely outcome over the next few months.

S&P 500

Telling the Truth?

Here is Richard Kovacevich, Chairman of Wells Fargo, telling Maria Bartiromo why his bank is different:

We did not make any No Doc, Low Doc, Option ARMs, Negative Amortization Loans, Stated Income, Teaser Rate ARMs through any subprime borrowers. None.

– Richard Kovacevich, CNBC interview

I believe it is true that they did not offer negatively amortizing products.  I also believe the entire statement can be considered true if you agree with Wells’ ideas as to what constituted “prime”.  Which I certainly don’t.

Strong Language

I see the SEC is considering a ban on short selling. This is, of course, the same SEC that has failed to take any action against companies that might have, say, spread false information to support their stock prices  (cough “we are well capitalized”, “KDP is willing to buy us”, “Buffett will save us” cough).  It’s the same SEC that in 2004 exempted certain large banks from regulations on capital requirements, allowing them to lever up as high as 40 to 1, and removed discounting designed to account for risk.

This is nothing short of a total panic by people who have no clue what they are doing. And to think, I mocked Russia for being a nation run by market commies.

– Barry Ritholz, The Big Picture

This is a move that reeks of desperation.  It’s also a move that historically results in what I like to call Epic Fail.  As Tim Knight said, “They can make shorting illegal. But not selling.”  If you want to see how well it worked for China, go take a look at the Shanghai Composite (from 6100 to 2000 and still falling).  All they’ve done is provide fuel for a rally at the expense of removing the fucking floor.  This is the kind of fetid donkey feces one expects to see in developing countries, shortly preceding the rioting and the stonings.  We are well into the land of unintended consequences, and Rick Santelli was absolutely correct back in Spring when he said “we might as well put a hammer and sickle on the flag”.